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Among the numerous anniversaries 
celebrated this year (1976 - ALR) - from Adam 
Smith to the General Strike - 1 would like to 
talk about one which continues to be of 
practical interest to socialists today.
Forty years ago, in 1936, the first people’s 
front governments were formed in France 
and Spain; that is to say, coalitions of 
communists with sodal-democrats and 
certain middle-class parties which were not 
seen as the immediate preliminary to 
revolution and working class power. Such 
governments had always before then been 
condemned by the revolutionary left. They 
were regarded as typically social-democratic,
likely to be dominated, directly or indirectly, 
by the bourgeoisie and therefore likely to 
divert the movement from its real task which 
was to make revolution. The only major 
exception to this might occur in colonial and 
semi-colonial countries, where - according to 
the P rogram  o f  the C om m u n ist 
International (1928) - the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was not the immediate aim of the 
communists, but a more or less rapid 
transition from a bourgeois-democratic to a 
socialist revolution wouldhaveto take place.
Without going into the complex history of 
earlier communist discussions, let me simply 
say that people’s front or coalition
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governments of the kind I have sketched 
were quite new and shocking in the 1930s, 
and raised serious debates within the 
revolutionary movement which have not 
ceased to this day. Before the war two 
people’s front governments failed. The 
French never overcame its internal 
contradictions and the half-heartedness of 
the Socialists who led it, and faded away in 
1938. The Spanish was faced with Franco’s 
rising, and went down in defeat in 1939. But 
people’s front governments, in the form of 
governments of anti-fascist unity in the war 
against Hitler were formed during and after 
the war, if anything on an even broader basis 
than had been envisaged in the 1930s. In 
1946 there were few countries which did not 
have them. They were the rule in the People’s 
Democracies (which were so-called precisely 
because they were not then supposed to be 
exclusively communist governments), and in 
the West there were Communist ministers in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy 
and Norway until they were expelled or 
resigned with the coming of the Cold'War. In 
the colonial and semi-colonial countries 
governments of a broad anti-imperialist 
front were, of course, also common and less 
controversial.
For several years after 1947 people’s front 
governments - outside the areas of colonial 
liberation - were neither practicable nor 
encouraged, but in the 1960s and 1970s there 
has been a return to this type of perspective, 
notably in Italy, France and Spain, At this 
moment the possible entry of the Italian CP 
into the government is the major issue in 
Italian politics. So the issues raised by such 
governments are not merely historical, but 
belong to practical politics.
Revolutionary Perspectives after 
World War I
The international communist movement 
was founded on the assumption that a world 
revolution, or at least a revolution in 
important regions of the world, was both 
practicable and imminent. That revolution 
would not necessarily take the Russian form, 
but nevertheless the October Revolution was 
in a profound sense the model both of what 
ought to and would happen, and of the 
strategy, tactics and organisation for 
making it happen. This is why the new
Communsit International insisted on the 
most rigid and exclusive conditions for 
joining it. It wanted an effective world party 
of revolutionaries. It obviously wanted to 
exclude from this movement and its national 
sections the rightwing Social-Democrats 
w ho h a d  b e t r a y e d  p r o le t a r ia n  
internationalism in 1914, and revealed 
themselves as deeply committed to capitalist 
society or even - as in Germany - as its main 
saviours. However, it also wanted to exclude 
anyone even partly committed to the non­
bolshevik way, anyone unwilling to break 
with social-democratic tradition and 
organisation in the most total and public 
manner.
In the excitement of the moment there 
were, after 1918, plenty of people and parties 
willing to declare themselves communists or 
even, carried away by the mood of global 
revolution or the radicalisation of the 
masses, to affiliate with the Communist 
International. What the International 
wanted, however, was not an influx of the 
miscellaneous left, but an international 
bolshevik party. It thus deliberately rejected 
most of those wanting to join it, leaving the 
quite important group of leftwing socialist 
parties - or at least those unwilling to make 
the total break - to float vaguely in the space 
between socia l-dem ocracy and the 
Comintern. Several of them tried briefly to 
organise themselves into the so-called ‘Two- 
and-a Half International’ or Vienna Union 
before drifting back to social-democracy 
after 1922, for want of anywhere else to go.
This approach made sense only on the 
assumption that the Russian revolution 
would soon be followed by other revolutions, 
or that an international revolutionary crisis 
offering similar perspectives would very 
soon recur. In 1918-20 this seemed a perfectly 
realistic assessment It is quite unhistorical 
to blame Lenin, in the light of hindsight, for 
setting up an International on the basis of 
splitting the old international movement - or 
what remained of it - on the narrowest and 
most exclusive basis. The situation looked, 
and was, revolutionary. In such a situation 
the masses would follow the most consistent 
revolutionaries. The vital thing was to see 
that these were consistently and effectively 
revolutionary, rather than to convert a larger 
percentage of the old non-bolshevik socialist 
parties into communist ones at the cost of
20 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 61
compromise.
Exploring Alternative Strategies
Hardly had the Comintern established 
itself effectively when it became clear that its 
original hopes would not be realised. From 
the early 1920s it had to operate in a non­
revolutionary situation, at least in most of 
Europe, though in much of the colonial, semi- 
c o lo n ia l  and d ep en d en t w orld  a 
revolutionary situation could be said to exist, 
or to be probable, or even imminent. 
However, at this stage the great majority of 
marxists did not regard the colonial 
revolution as the immediate forerunners of 
the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and 
socialist construction. As the program of the 
Communist International put it in 1928:
“as a rule, transition to the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in these countries will be possible 
only through a series ofpreparatory stages, as 
the outcome of a whole period of 
transformation of bourgeois-democratic 
revolution into socialist revolution”.
We need not here discuss the debates, 
mainly centred on the Chinese Revolution, 
which were eventually to lead to a different 
view of the political prospects of colonial 
liberation.
From 1921 the Comintern thus found itself 
in the difficult situation of having to work 
out a strategy on the assumption that further 
October Revolutions were not in fact likely to 
take place. This was awkward. As Karl 
Radek put it at its Fourth Congress (1922): “ It 
is particularly difficult in a period when 
there are no popular revolts to pursue a 
Communist political policy.” It was doubly 
awkward, since the very principles on which 
the International had been constructed now 
made it more difficult to mobilise, and co­
operate with, those large sectors of the 
movement which it had been designed to 
exclude. The Comintern found itself in a 
position rather like an army equipped for 
offensive, breakthrough and pursuit, which 
suddenly and unexpectedly finds itself 
obliged to settle down to a lengthy siege.
To do it credit - and the Communist 
International receives little enough credit 
nowadays - it set about seriously rethinking 
its European strategy almost immediately, 
with the launching of the United Front 
policy in 1921. However, the discussions 
about the new strategy and the new 
perspectives were confused by four
important factors. First and foremost, the 
hope of a European - or at least a German - 
October were not abandoned but only 
postponed; at first briefly, but after the 
failure o f insurrection in Germany in 1923, 
for a longer period - perhaps until the next 
capitalist crisis. Alternative strategies were 
therefore still largely seen as something 
designed to fill in time until a new 
revolutionary crisis made a new and better- 
prepared October possible.
Second, opinion w ithin the new 
Communist parties was divided and, on the 
whole, unenthusiastic. Those who had j oined 
them had done so precisely because they 
wanted revolution and a total break with the 
old social-democratic tradition. They were 
ready to follow the line, but left to 
themselves, most of them sympathised with 
what was increasingly clearly a sectarian 
position. This was very clear in the German 
Communist Party.
Third, the divisions and arguments within 
communist parties were unfortunately but 
necessarily entangled with the internal 
struggles and debates within the Soviet 
party in the 1920s. This was particularly 
evident in the period 1928-34 when a policy of 
almsot suicidal sectarianism was imposed 
on the parties from Moscow. That such a 
policy had some support within the parties is 
undoubted; but I don’t think it would have 
established itself in, for example, the British 
Communist Party without Moscow.
Fourth, and more defensibly, the task of 
turning the new communist parties, so 
largely composed of former social- 
democrats, syndicalists or small leftwing 
sects, into proper leninist parties, remained. 
After all, the case for Lenin’s type of party 
(with or without its Stalinist developments or 
deformations) was not simply that such a 
party was required to make insurrection. It 
was required for any form of effective 
struggle for, and construction of, socialism.
Popular Front Strategy
So, though alternative strategies were 
explored within the Comintern in the 1920s, 
and occasionally surfaced, it was not until 
the 1930s that they were systematically 
developed. The movement had, vaguely, 
looked forward to the coming world crisis of 
capitalism as something which would 
somehow automatically produce a 
revolutionary situation. Instead it produced
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the most staggering and undeniable debacle, 
assisted, without any doubt, by the ultra­
sectarianism of the Comintern line after 
1928.
In early 1933 the entire European 
perspective of the International lay in ruins. 
Hitler was in power in the country to which 
Lenin had once hoped soon to transfer the 
headquarters of international socialism, and 
the German CP was in exile, in concentration 
camps, or a hunted, illegal rump of cadres. 
Italian fascism felt strong enough actually 
to let some communists out of jail in an 
amnesty in 1932. The only other CP in 
western Europe with major support, the 
French, had been reduced to 28,000 members 
and 12 seats in Parliament. It was no longer 
possible to deny that the failure of the world 
revolution to occur in 1917-20 had been more 
than a temporary setback. The defeat of 
1928-33 was clearly o f more lasting 
significance, even though for another year or 
more officially the Comintern maintained 
that all was well, though with an 
increasingly strained air. What was more to 
the point, the movement was not only beaten 
but pursued. Fascism was advancing on all 
fronts. Something had to be done, if only to 
mobilise an effective defence.
It is not necessary here to analyse the way 
in which the International came to adopt the 
Popular Front strategy, or the elements in 
earlier discussions within the communist 
movement which anticipated it and from 
which it was developed. We know that it was 
pioneered in France in 1934, and officially 
adopted by the International at its Seventh 
Congress - the first for seven years - in 1935, 
which totally reversed the former policy of 
seeing social-democracy as the main enemy. 
The new line was put forward in two 
powerful and visibly heartfelt reports by the 
new General Secretary of the International, 
George Dimitrov, and his assistant - also new 
as a spokesman for the International 
Palmiro Togliatti, or, as he was then known, 
Ercoli.
The point I wish to make here is that the 
Popular Front strategy now adopted was 
more than a temporary defensive tactic, or 
even a strategy for eventually turning retreat 
into offensive. It was also a carefully 
considered strategy of advancing to 
socialism. It was, in my view, the first, and so 
far still the only, such strategy evolved for 
countries in which the cla ssica l
insurrectionary situations of the type of the 
October revolution or of other types were not 
to be expected, though not necessarily 
impossible. This does not mean that it was 
bound to succeed. I hope to say something of 
its limitations and failures later. Anyway, no 
strategy is bound to succeed, though some 
are bound to fail. The search for the magic 
pill, certified by white-coated or red-flagged 
scientists, and absolutely guaranteed to cure 
cancer, cholera, rheumatism and the 
common cold or their political equivalents, 
belongs to the field of self-delusion and 
advertisement rather than to the field of 
politics.
Unity the core
Just to remind ourselves: the core of the 
Popular Front strategy was unity. It was a 
set of concentric circles of unity: at its centre 
the United Front of the working class 
movement which in turn formed the basis of 
an even broader anti-fascist People’s Front, 
which in turn provided in the relevant 
countries the base for a national front of all 
those determined to resist fascism in the 
form of the danger from Hitler, Mussolini 
and the Japanese, and finally - even more 
loosely - an international front of 
governments and peoples - including the 
USSR ■ against fascism and war. Each of 
these circles had, as it were, a different 
degree of unity.
The object of the United Front was the 
reunification of labor movements split 
mainly between social-democrats and 
communists. This was quite clear in the trade 
union field where the merger of separate 
socialist and communist (or other) unions 
into a single comprehensive trade union 
federation was envisaged - and sometimes, 
as in France, achieved. Mergers of socialist 
and communist parties into a single working 
class party were not seriously envisaged in 
practice, since the conditions for such unity 
laid down by Dimitrov amounted to asking 
social-democratic parties to become 
communist ones by committing themselves 
to “ the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 
form o f  S ov iets”  and “ dem ocratic 
centralism” o f the Bolshevik type. 
Nevertheless the question of the political 
reunificatioiTof the labor movement, “of a 
single political mass party of the working 
class” was formally declared to be urgent, 
and in the form of a merger of existing
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parties rather than of attracting the masses 
away from social-democracy to the 
communists.
The People's Fronts and the broader 
hational fronts were to have a rather loose 
unity - they were in fact alliances - though, in 
the course of the anti-fascist struggle a more 
permanent unity came to be envisaged, in the 
form of People’s Democracies or the western 
governments based on the unity of all anti­
fascist resistance forces. The international 
unity was more ad hoc still; though, once 
again at the peak of the wartime alliance 
but this was after the abolition of the 
Comintern - the Russians envisaged 
something like its permanent or semi­
permanent prolongation into peacetime.
Strategically, the basic principle of the 
new policy was to:
“ find a com m on language with the broadest 
masses for the purposes of struggling against 
the class enemy, to find ways of finally 
ov ercom in g  th e  i s o l a t i o n  o f  th e  
revolu tionary  vanguard from the masses of 
the proletariat and all other toilers, as well as 
overcoming the fatal isolation  o f  the 
w ork in g  class itse lf from its natural allies 
in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, 
against fascism. (Dimitrov.)
In short, the working class had been 
defeated because it had allowed itself to be 
isolated; it would win by isolating its main 
enemies.
Defensive and Offensive
The novelty of this strategy was to use the 
same weapons for defensive and offensive 
purposes. For the People’s Front was, from 
the start, envisaged not simply as a 
necessary short-term alliance of desperation 
against an enemy who threatened forces 
which had nothing in common except the 
fear of this threat. This might be so, as it 
were, on the extreme outskirts of anti-fascist 
unity. Thus the British Communist Party 
shocked its allies in 1938 by proposing to 
extend its support to Churchill, just as 
Churchill in 1941 shocked his supporters by 
unhesitatingly extending it to Stalin - both 
on the same grounds, namely that even the 
devil was a good enough ally against Hitler if 
her was prepared to fight him. However, 
governments of the anti-fascist people’s 
front, based on working class unity, which 
were the logical outcome of the policy, were 
from the outset also envisaged as possible
elements in the transition from capitalism to 
socialism. The Comintern was extremely 
cautious and qualified in its formulations of 
this question, but clear enough to state that: 
“It may be that in a number of countries the 
united front government will prove to be 
one of the most important transitional 
forms". More generally, it was clearly stated 
that the fight against fascism was the main 
way forward in the struggle for socialism. To 
defeat it would also be to strike a major blow 
at capitalism.
The arguments for this, though not often 
stated with great clarity in public, were as 
follows. Fascism was the logical expression 
of monopoly capitalism, which had reduced 
the effective control of the economy to a 
handful of ultra-powerful corporations or 
groups - the “two hundred families”, as the 
French put it. These crucial groups of 
concentrated capitalist power, in a period of 
revolution and intensifying class struggle, 
saw their main salvation in fascism at home 
and abroad. As the French reactionaries put 
it frankly, when faced with a Popular Front 
government in their own country: “ Better 
Hitler than Leon Blum” . In fact, the bulk of 
French big business took the logical step of 
collaborating with the Germans, and much 
of private industry after the war was 
expropriated, not on the grounds that it had 
so collaborated, e.g. the Renault works. 
Under these circumstances the call for anti­
fascist struggle was in effect also the call for 
struggle against the most powerful, 
dangerous and decisive sectors of monopoly 
capital. It was not a struggle against the 
bourgeoisie as such, but, as Manuilsky 
argued in his survey of the Congress 
(nprecorr 1935, p. 1, 696): “ Whilst we are 
undermining the power of these elements, we 
are at the same time undermining the power 
of the bourgeoisie as a whole because.... (it) is 
indissolubly connected with the most 
reactionary, most chauvinist and most 
imperialist elements of finance capital.”
This was excessively optimistic, for two 
reasons. First, because not all bourgeoisie, 
and not even all groups of monopoly 
capitalists, joined the fascists and thus made 
themselves vulnerable to attack on this 
ground. The Americans and the British, for 
one, eventually fought fascism. Second, and 
more seriously, because it assumed that 
fascism was a lasting phase of capitalist 
development, that bourgeois democracy was
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permanently abandoned as no longer 
compatible with capitalism, so that the 
defence of liberal democracy became 
objectively anti-capitalist. In the 1930s this 
was not implausible. Most of us believed it. 
But, as it turned out, fascism was a 
temporary and regional pha&e of world 
capitalism^ arid after 1945 it returned to a 
modified and bureaucratised version of 
liberal democracy.
Period of Anti-fascist Unity
However, in the 1930s and 1940s the front 
line between fascism and anti-fascism was 
indeed that of the class struggle, and the 
popular front strategy enabled the left to 
fight it with the maximum number of allies, 
all the more so as it was evidently defending 
itself, its allies, and its nations, against 
fascist attack. What is more, insofar as this 
defence was necessarily armed - as in Spain 
and later in World War II ■ it turned into a 
revolutionary struggle in which the 
communists were able to increase their 
influence, sometimes decisively, by virtue of 
their obvious effectiveness and leadership. 
Let us not forget that the period of the 
strategy of anti-fascist unity eventually led 
not only to something that had been hardly 
conceivable in Western Europe, namely 
armed guerrilla warfare - on a much larger 
scale than anything in, say, Latin America, 
since the war - but also, and more important, 
to the extension of socialist power to large 
parts of Eatern Europe. Much of this was due 
to the Red Army, but by no means all. 
Yugoslavia, Albania, probably in a large 
degree Bulgaria and - until suppressed by a 
British intervention - Greece, were genuinely 
home-grown liberation movements.
Moreover, from the narrower point of view 
of the success of communist parties, the 
period of anti-fascist unity was as brilliantly 
successful as the 1920s had been 
disappointing. There was no communist 
party, however insignificant, which did not 
gain relatively enormous -ground. I have 
mentioned the disastrous situation of these 
parties in 1933. Twelve years later, at the end 
of the war, the European parties were at their 
all-time peak, except for the German one 
which {in West Germany) never recovered 
from Hitler, and the Spanish which shared 
the defeat of the Republic by Franco.
In France and Italy the party was, or was 
on the way to becoming, the majority party of
the working class for the first time. Even in 
countries where it had never established any 
support comparable to that of the socialists, 
its vote rose dramatically; 13 per cent in 
Belgium (or more than double its best 
previous performance^ 12.5 per cent in 
Denmark (or more than five times its 
previous best), 23.5 per cent in. Finland (or 
almost double its previous best), 10 per cent 
in Holland (or about three times its previous 
best), 12 per cent in Norway (or double its 
previous best), 10 per cent in Sweden (or 
almost double). Even in Britain, you may 
recall, the two communist MPs elected in 
1945 mark the high point of the party’s 
modest electoral achievement.
In one sense the period of anti-fascist unity 
was therefore an undoubted success. It 
reversed the global trend towards fascism, 
defeated fascism, and furthermore got the 
communist parties out of their sectarian 
isolation. If the French and Italian 
Communist Parties have replaced the 
socialist party as the major party of the 
working class in their countries, it was due to 
the experiences of the anti-fascist period. On 
the other hand, the possible contribution of 
people’s front governments to a transition to 
socialism is much more debatable.
Debate in the International Movement
There was indeed a deep, if not always 
acknowledged, division on this question 
within the communist movement. The USSR 
was primarily interested in its own security - 
mainly against German aggression - and in 
diplomatic alliances to safeguard it. I think it 
is safe to say that it was seriously interested 
in people’s fronts chiefly from thiB point of 
view, and not from the immediate point of 
view of making revolutions or the prospects 
of transition to socialism in other countries. 
Since the defeat and destruction of the USSR 
would have been a fatal setback to the 
movement everywhere, communist parties 
were also prepared to subordinate 
everything to the defence of the USSR, 
though this did not prevent them! having 
plans for advancing to socialism in their own 
countries.
But what plans? There was a leftwing view 
which still believed that a return to the 
classical revolutionary perspective was 
essential. If a broad front was necessary at 
all - and within the Comintern, Bela Kun, 
Lozovsky and some others were far from
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Convinced - it should simply, as it were, "get 
the golf-ball of revolution out of the bunker 
into which it had got itself by 1933, after 
which the game would go on as before. The 
people’s front was at best an educational 
device by means of which non-communist 
workers could learn that revolution was the 
only way. In fact, the people’s front slogan 
led to an enormous revitalisation and 
strengthening of the left, both in France and 
Spain. The victory of people’s front 
governments produced a spontaneous 
radicalisation in the masses in both 
countries, which - some people argue - ought 
to have been used to make a bid for power in 
France, and which actually produced a social 
revolution in Spain, when Franco made his 
insurrection. I do not want to discuss the 
criticisms of communist policy which have 
been made about these episodes, beyond 
saying that I do not believe there was a 
revolutionary situation in France in 1936, 
and that in Spain the need to defeat Franco 
inevitably dominated the policy of the 
people’s front government.
Policy of the Long Haul
But within the Comintern there was 
another perspective, though it was only 
hinted at, because those who had previously 
put forward such views had been damned or 
expelled as rightwing deviationists, e.g. 
George Lukacs, who was forced out of politics 
and into literary criticism for this reason, 
between 1928 and 1956. Antonio Gramsci 
(whose friend Togliatti was now one of the 
chief spokesmen of the International) had 
elaborated a policy based on the assumption 
that the lost opportunity of 1917-20 would not 
recur, and that communist parties must 
envisage not a short frontal offensive but a 
lengthy war of position - a policy of the long 
haul. In effect, they must win the leadership 
of a broad alliance of social forces, and 
m aintain  this leadership during a 
prolonged period of transition, in which the 
actual transfer of power was only one 
episode.
In the west communists were not 
confronted with a state which had only to 
collapse for the working class to seize power. 
The state was only the first line of the 
bourgeoisie’s defence. Behind it there was a 
whole system of bunkers and fortresses'- the 
institutions of civil society which established 
the legitimacy of bourgeois rule. Again,
unlike the East - 1 quote Karl Radek (1922) 
“in the West the working masses are not so 
amorphous .... They are members of parties 
and they stick to their parties. In the East, in 
Russia, it was easier to bring them into the 
fold of communism after the outbreak of the 
revolutionary storm. In your countries it is 
much more difficult.” Or, as Dimitrov put it 
in 1935:
“ It is a common mistake of a Leftist character 
to imagine that, as soon as a political {or 
re volution ary) crisis arises, it is enough for the 
Communist leaders to throw out the slogan of 
revolutionary insurrection, and the masses 
will follow.”
. The struggle for hegemony over a long 
period implied two things: that even in the 
west the slogan of an immediate transition to 
the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was 
correct only in exceptional circumstances, 
and second, that it was • Wrong for the 
communists tp refuse to take any interest in 
government until after they had made their 
own revolution. On the contrary, the more 
they did so, the more they left hegemony m 
the hands of the bourgeoisie, and condemned 
themselves to subalternity.
Now insofar as the people’s front 
governments were seen as possible regimes 
of transition to socialism, they therefore 
implied that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was not the immediate program 
of the communists, and that there would be 
an intermediate phase between the rule of the 
bourgeoisie and socialism. (I am not here 
discussing the meaning of the term 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ which has 
now such associations that many western 
communist parties are abandoning it.) Hut 
as I have tried to show above, there was a 
major weakness in this analysis. It made 
sense on the assumption that capitalism was 
fatally weakened by the defeat of fascism. As 
we have seen, this was not so. After the war it 
still made sense - though a bit less - on the 
assumption that capitalism would not 
recover. But as we know, it did. It made sense 
on the assumption that the people’s front 
government was decisively tilted to the left, 
so that it could not drift back into being a 
bourgeois coalition with a socialist or 
communist appendix. But, outside Eastern 
Europe after the war, this was not so. On the 
contrary, the governments of anti-fascist 
unity in western Europe could get rid of their 
communists whenever they wished and in
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any case kept them in subordinate positions 
where they took the blame for unpopular 
government/ policies - e.g. as ministers1 of 
labor. ' .
It is true that in Eastern Europe after the 
war - 1945-47 - there were genuine alliance 
governments, and not merely communist 
regimes in fancy dress, although the left 
wing in the communist movement - led at the 
time by the Yugoslavs - regarded this as 
undesirable. Thus Dimitrov in 1946 said: 
“Our immediate task is not the realisation of 
socialism, but' the consolidation of the 
democratic and parliamentary system.” 
‘People’s Democracy’ then was not yet a 
synonym for the dictatorship of the 
communist party, nor was a single way of 
development - patterned on the USSR - 
imposed on the East European states. But 
with the coming of the cold war this ended, 
and little was left of the perspective of a 
gradual transition  to socia lism  in 
accordance with conditions in each country,
. except the name ‘People’s Democracy’ which 
was now meaningless.
Situation in which People’ s Fronts 
Arise .
The criticisms of people's fronts and broad 
alliances by the western ultra-left envisages 
similar development. Such governments are 
rejected unless they are the immediate 
precursors of socialist power, i.e. unless they 
stop being people’s fronts" and turn 
themselves into ‘dictatorships o f the 
proletariat’ . Here the present ultra-left 
echoes, among other things, the opinions of 
Leon Trotsky who dism issed the 
Comintern’s policies in the wildest and most 
sectarian manner, (1) though he had earlier 
made some very sound criticisms of the 
Comintern’s disastrous sectarianism before 
1934. Trotsky and other ultra-radicals at the 
time rejected the very idea of the broad anti­
fascist alliance, and when it became clear 
that it stimulated a striking revival and 
growth of the movement, rejected it for not 
immediately proceeding to make a classical 
revolution. Recent ultra-leftist attitudes 
towards Chile have been along the same 
lines.
This was and is to misunderstand the 
situation in which people’s fronts arise. 
Broad alliances of groups and parties, 
including people’s fronts, are necessary only 
when the working class party is not strong
enough to win on its own: it rarely is. Rut 
when such alliances or fronts are necessary, 
they, therefore consist of a variety of groups 
arid organisations with very different 
opinions, some of them not even- socialist. 
They are united only against a common 
enemy, or for a common program which 
represents only the first step for some 
participants, whereas for others it marks the
• furthest point to which they are at the 
' moment prepared to go. This follows from the 
fact that they are neither socially nor 
politically honogeneous. In short, if they are 
to be more than brief political interludes, the 
socialists within such alliances must 
convince and carry along their allies, or at 
least neutralise them. If they fail to do so, 
they simply revert to being a relatively 
impotent minority group. Indeed, they might 
even be worse off, if their policy had 
antagonised formerly allied, neutral or 
indifferent strata, allowing these to be 
mobilised by the class enemy.
Some Criticisms
The Italian Communist leader Berlinguer 
has quite rightly pointed out that this is so in 
countries such as ours, whether there are 
people’s fronts or not. Even if the Italian CP 
were to get 51 per cent of the votes - or even a 
lot more - and establish a pure CP 
government, it would still have to carry most 
of the other 49 per cent with it. The Italian 
analysis of the tragic Chilean experience is 
that Allende failed not simply because his 
Popular Unity was unable technically to 
defeat the military, but because it alienated 
large sectors of the population which it ought 
to have carried with it, or at least not allowed 
or stim ulated to becom e bitterly  
antagonistic. It thus isolated itself at the 
very moment of danger, and provided the 
military plotters with both an excuse for 
their coup and at least a temporary mass 
base: of social support for it.: In: short, 
socialists must not allow themselves to 
forget strategy and politics - isolating the 
adversary, winning friends and influencing 
people - by falling into the trap of arithmetic - 
whether in the social-democratic manner by 
counting votes, or the ultra-radical manner 
by couhting guns. Which is not to say that 
either can be neglected.
Furthermore, the problem of winning 
political support does not disappear even 
when the revolutionaries are actually in
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effective possession of power. Portugal is  a 
sad example of a country in which they lost a 
historic opportunity, partly by relying too 
exclusively on the backing of a military state 
power whose revolutionary maturity and 
homogeneity they overestimated, partly by 
the old leftist error of supposing that even in 
a revolutionary situation all the masses will 
automatically rally to the revolutionary 
slogans. They neglected the real distribution 
of political forces in their country - the fact 
that the workers and landless peasants were 
only a minority, the church’s influence, and 
the ease with which the small and middle 
peasants of the North could be mobilised by 
anti-communist slogans.
This is not to say that people’s front 
governments ought not to be criticised. They 
may not try to advance towards socialism at 
all, and therefore be no more than ordinary - 
temporary coalitions. I think the French 
Popular Front of 1936 is open to this 
criticism. They may rely too much on being, 
as it were, carried in the right direction by 
inevitable historical forces. As suggested 
above, this was the weakness of the 
argument that the defeat of fascism must 
entail the decline of capitalism, or that 
capitalism after the war would not be able to 
recover its initiative and dynamism. This 
meant that communists who entered such 
governments did not do enough to change 
the political structures of their countries. For 
instance, it may be argued that the Italian 
Communist Party in 1945, when it had the 
weight of anti-fascist insurrection behind it, 
neglected to destroy the structure of the old 
fascist bureaucracy and the political power 
of the Church, relying too much on a new and 
admittedly very progressive Constitution 
which they helped to draft. Again, people’s 
fronts may be criticised for failing to 
appreciate the very serious problems of 
transforming heterogeneous and mutually 
suspicious coalitions or electoral alliances 
into effective reforming governments. This 
criticism can certainly be made of the 
Chilean Popular Unity. They may finally 
somr+imes be criticised for not sufficiently 
appreciating the basic fact that governments 
which go too far for the ruling class may be 
overthrown by it, or its allies, or its foreign 
supporters.
The Strategy which Reaction Fears
Still, when all these criticisms have been
made the people’s fronts remain to this day 
the socialist strategy which most frightens 
the enemy. They are not scared of barricades 
going up in Milan or Paris. On the other 
hand, they have always regarded unity as 
the main danger. Why did the Americans 
spend so much energy and money in the 
1950s splitting the national and 
international trade union movements and 
any progressive or socialist party (such as 
the Italian) willing to co-operate with 
communists? Why did ideologists invent the 
myth that nobody could ever co-operate with 
communists without being swallowed by 
them - unless to discourage such co­
operation? (2) Why that other myth, 
according to which no people has ever freely 
voted a red government into office? Why, 
only this spring, did the US government 
order its ambassador to warn every 
European socialist party against having 
anything to do with communists? Why do 
Ford and Kissinger repeat daily that the 
entry of communists into any government, 
especially the Italian, is intolerable? Why is 
the Spanish government planning to legalise 
all parties except the Communist Party? 
Because they are afraid of the strategy of the 
broad alliance. They would much prefer the 
revolutionaries to isolate themselves, the 
more sectarian in spirit, the better. They 
know that in most countries where socialism 
has come, it has been brought about by broad 
fronts led by communists - whether in the 
form of people’s fronts or not - rather than 
through the isolated action of revolutionary 
marxists. No war of liberation could have 
been won on any other terms.
It is sometimes a good thing to remind 
ourselves of what the enemy fears most. 
Today, in spite of two generations of 
criticism from the left, what he fears most - 
especially in the developed countries of 
Europe - is still the sort of strategy first 
systematically adopted by the international 
communist movement in the 1930s.
(1) He actually seems to have believed that people's 
fronts “ doom the working class to impotence and 
clear the road for faseism ”  <mv emphasis -
E.J.H.)
(2) In fact, such alliances have as often as nui, 
benefited the non-communists who got rid of the 
communists when they had served their purpose. 
Communists have never regarded this as a reason 
for condemning all alliances on principle.
